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Smithson Investment Trust plc Annual Report for the year ended 31 December 2023
conversion, which is lower than the 101% recorded last year. As
explained in the 2022 report, cash flow has been depressed for
many of our companies due to the re-build of inventory after supply
chains returned to normal following the Covid pandemic. This is
already starting to improve and will likely continue to do so in 2024.
Not overpaying for these companies can be assessed by looking at
the average free cash flow yield (the free cash flow divided by the
market capitalisation) of the portfolio
. While the valuation currently
appears expensive, with the free cash flow yield of the portfolio now
at 2.4%, the method we have traditionally used to calculate it is very
backward looking, with the valuation for many companies being
generated by 2022 cash flows due to the timing of their reports. As
mentioned above, this includes a significant period when cash flow
was depressed. Adjusting the measure to use only 2023 cash flows
would put the portfolio free cash flow yield at around 2.8%, which
we think is more indicative of the current position, bearing in mind
we expect more progress on free cash flow normalisation in 2024.
Further, a couple of our companies are still recovering from specific
issues which have completely depleted their free cash flow, so
should these companies start producing cash again next year, as
appears likely, it would potentially take the portfolio free cash flow
yield back above 3%.
In terms of ‘doing nothing’, there was some trading activity as
discussed earlier. This meant that discretionary portfolio turnover,
excluding share buybacks, was 27.2% compared to 48.5% in 2022.
Excluding the sale and reinvestment of the proceeds from the
Simcorp bid, over which we had no choice, the turnover was 15.4%.
Despite the changes made to the portfolio, this is much lower than
last year and still far below the average turnover for actively
managed equity funds, which tends to be above 60%, according to
Morningstar.
Costs of dealing, including taxes, amounted to 0.03% (3 basis
points) of NAV in the period, slightly lo
wer than the 0.03% incurred
in 2022, although both figures round to the same number. The
Ongoing Charge Figure was 0.87% of NAV, compared with 0.91% in
2022. This includes the Management Fee of 0.9%, applied to the
market capitalisation of the Trust, which was lower than the NAV
during the year. Combined, this means the T
otal Cost of Investment
in the Trust was 0.90% of NAV (2022: 0.94%).
To review in more detail the fund performance in 2023, I highlight
the largest detractors of performance below.
Country Contribution %
Sabre United States -1.5%
Masimo United States -1.2%
Paycom Software United States -0.7%
Cognex United States -0.5%
Domino’s Pizza Enterprises Australia -0.5%
Source: Northern Trust
Sabre, travel software company, was the largest detractor in 2023
for two reasons. First, during the course of the year it became
apparent that travel industry volumes, whilst still recovering, were
growing slower than the rates seen in 2021 and 2022. Second,
Sabre took on significant debt during the pandemic and the
company’s profitability was therefore impacted by the sharp rise in
interest rates. We continue to believe that the travel industry will
keep growing, which will in turn enable the company to reduce its
debt over time to the benefit of our equity investment.
Our issues with Masimo have been outlined above and although we
made money on the position over our period of ownership, having
sold shares at much higher levels during the pandemic, we
unfortunately lost money on the remaining holding during the course
of this year.
Paycom, the US company providing human resources management
software, underperformed after management reduced its guidance
for revenue growth this year. With revenue tied to the number of
employees enrolled in its software, the weaker US jobs market over
the last 12 months provided a more difficult backdrop for the
company’s short term growth.
Cognex, the US factory and warehouse automation company,
suffered declining revenue and earnings throughout the year as its
largest customers held back on building or upgrading their
manufacturing and logistics facilities. Consumer electronics was a
sector particularly hard hit. As we see no fundamental issues with
the company or its competitive position, we continue to hold as we
wait for the expected upturn to arrive in the coming years.
The performance of Domino’s Pizza Ent
erprises was also disappointing
in the period. This was primarily due t
o the fiscal half year results,
released in February, indicating weaker sales after prices and delivery
charges had been increased to offset cost inflation. Consumer price
sensitivity was noted in Japan and Germany particularly. Fortunately,
the company’s performance was much improved in the second half of
its fiscal year, so management now appear to be resolving the issue.
Investment Manager’s Review
Strategic Report
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