
MIGO Opportunities Trust plc / Annual Report 2026
08
Contributors
Baker Steel Resources Trust (BSRT) was the largest
contributor over the year (adding 641bps), with
its NAV doubling and its shares rising 151% as the
discount tightened from 42% to 27%. We reduced
our position over the year into this strength. Gold
and silver prices spiked in early 2025 and other
metals such as tungsten and tin have also moved
higher bolstering the listed portion of BSRT’s
portfolio. The private holdings also made good
progress during the year with the refinancing of
Futura, a thermal coal miner in Australia, which
willenable the company to bring both mines into
full production.
Despite the strong performance from the shares,
the discount remains wide. We have been
engaged with the board on the need for a more
stringent capital allocation policy. BSRT began
its first ever share buyback programme in Q1-26,
and followed this up with the announcement of
a revised capital allocation policy in April that will
see 5% of NAV returned each year via a 3% of NAV
dividend (a 4% dividend yield on share price as at
the end of the period) with the balance delivered
via share buybacks or additional dividends.
Furthermore, there is now a commitment to return
50% of the net profits from material exits via tender
offers if the shares are trading at a discount in
excess of 25%. We believe this implicit discount
target to be lacking in ambition and will continue to
engage with the Board.
During the year from April 2025, shares in Georgia
Capital (CGEO) were up 142% and the discount
narrowed from 44% to 18%, with the investment
contributing 425bps to MIGO’s NAV return. Post
period end, we sold the last of our holding on
the back of further discount tightening and gains
in NAV. CGEO’s largest holding, Lion Finance
(formerly Bank of Georgia) had performed
particularly well but, after some extraordinary
performance, it no longer looked as cheap trading
at around 2x book value. Our investment in CGEO
generated a 24% IRR and 183% total return over its
life (we first acquired shares in 2019).
VH Global Energy Infrastructure (ENRG)
contributed 301bps to returns as its discount
narrowed from 46% to 31% which compounded
with a 6% NAV return. ENRG owns a portfolio
of energy transition assets across multiple
geographies such as Brazil, Australia and the
US. In August 2025, the company moved into
an orderly wind-down having languished on
a wide discount for a couple of years. ENRG’s
mix of technologies and geographical spread
coupled with its small size meant it struggled to
attract investors, especially once interest rates
and inflation increased in a backdrop where even
much larger and more liquid trusts floundered.
M&A transactions and public market comparables
are supportive of carrying values, and we note
the management team are highly aligned with
shareholders via an incentive fee structure that
rewards early exits at strong valuations. Our
extensive modelling of the wind-down scenarios
indicates an attractively asymmetric return profile.
Seraphim Space (SSIT) has had a spectacular
recovery in 2025/26. We first invested in SSIT at
an extreme discount to NAV in late 2023 and sold
out in July 2025 having generated a healthy 40%
IRR. One of the hardest things for fund managers
is to buy back into something at a higher price
than you sold but we overcame this psychological
hurdle to re-establish a position in January 2026
at what was a single-digit premium to reported
NAV. Its largest holding ICEYE had won a key
contract with Germany’s armed forces and, in
our view, appeared extremely undervalued at its
reported carrying value. We believed that using
a more appropriate valuation put the shares on a
discount to NAV. This was subsequently vindicated
with ICEYE’s valuation written up 300% since our
reinvestment.
Excitement around the SpaceX IPO has helped fuel
a boom in space technology companies and SSIT
and the listed portion of its underlying portfolio has
benefited. This is a trust where retail excitement
and disillusionment can see the share price swing
wildly. We are therefore very active on trading this
position, highlighting MIGO’s ability to add value
in this way. Over the period covered by this report,
SSIT added 278bps to MIGO’s NAV.
Detractors
Both our US solar trusts, US Solar Fund (USF)
and Ecofin US Renewable Infrastructure (RNEW),
were detractors (deducting 114bps and 90bps
respectively). The Big Beautiful Bill, passed by
President Trump in July 2025 removed a lot of
support for the US renewable energy sector and
we saw the market slump in response. Higher
interest rates, a buyers’ market and lower power
prices created a difficult backdrop for US solar
funds looking to sell assets.
RNEW was pushed into wind-down in 2024
following poor performance and a sustained
widening of the discount. Exacerbating the weak
backdrop were several idiosyncratic issues with
the underlying portfolio (including damage to an
asset from a whirlwind and cables being chewed
through by rodents). This resulted in several write
downs in the portfolio and assets sold below
carrying values.
Similarly, USF has been up for sale for some
time but has struggled with poor operational
performance and in March announced that the
dividend had been “paused” while generation
from the portfolio was reassessed. Post period
end, however, USF announced it had received
a non-binding letter of intent from a prospective
buyer to whom it has granted a 90-day exclusivity
period. USF’s share price responded well and we
await the outcome of negotiations with interest,
noting on both sides of the ledger that the volatile
geopolitical and regulatory backdrop makes failed
deals more likely but that USF’s NAV, to which its
shares still trade at a material (39%) discount, implies
a per megawatt (MW) valuation for the portfolio
substantially lower than the cost to build new assets.
Chrysalis (CHRY) detracted 70bps from MIGO’s
NAV, largely due to a widening discount. The weak
share price seemed initially attributable to the
shares being caught up in the AI disruption/tech
sell off. In our view, CHRY’s portfolio companies
have little in common with the software as a
service (‘SaaS’) businesses in the market’s firing
line. While Starling Bank, CHRY’s largest holding,
has a SaaS-style subsidiary called Engine which
provides banking software to third-party clients,
this is still a nascent part of Starling’s current value
(although it certainly does have the potential
to grow into a more meaningful value driver).
Furthermore, we do not expect businesses with
such deep specialist domain knowledge, operating
in arguably the most regulated and risk-averse
industry, to have their business models disrupted
by ‘DIY’ tools.
It is a matter of public record that we have been
engaged with CHRY’s board on the company’s
future, and as such we were supportive of the
proposals announced in February 2026 that would
see the company adopt an orderly realisation
policy with no new investments being made. These
proposals were approved by shareholders at a
meeting in late-March.
Strategic Report / Investment Manager’s Report continued